Intersectionality

The question of whether intersectionality and intersectional politics have something to offer cannot be simple in the face of a post-structuralist critique of identity-based politics. I would still argue, though, that politics of traditional reformation – arguably ill-configured as they may be – are provably productive, and even as the post-structuralist critique has its point, the point does not extend to wholly paralyzing political activity, even as it critiques it.

The initial, potentially simplistic point of intersectionality is this – that when two oppressions intersect, such as in the case of black women, extreme marginalization occurs. In paying attention to the oppression of the dominant group within either oppressive category, those that exist in this intersection conveniently disappear so as not to muddy the narrative of oppression of those groups. Black women, for instance, find their narrative of racism co-opted by (patriarchal) black men, and (racist) white women. They themselves, facing a double oppression, of sorts, cease to exist in the narrative of oppression.

Intersectionality seeks to uncover and champion these narratives of marginalized oppression of all strokes, in some sense. It tries to complicate and broaden conceptions of straight-forward discrimination. It is the inclusion of the last and the least – that is to say, it claims, ultimately, that there is no true liberation until all oppressions are addressed.

The critique against this, as by Butler, doesn’t have a problem with the morality of these claims, which I feel is important. The critique is based on the structuring of these claims. The problem is that these oppressions – of race, gender, class, sexual orientation – are reified – made things in and of themselves, that can objectively be eradicated from a detached distance and privileged, objective, identity. Thus the category of woman becomes reified and arguments of difference, and ‘equal rights with men’ are posited off of this assumption, rather than recognizing its very categorization as the basis of oppression.

Butler would argue, instead, that all ‘things’ – from identity to oppression – are constructed through relationships of power – and thus, equally, through lack of power, and oppression. As such, a positional argument cannot be revolutionary, inasmuch as it accepts the societal construction of power in order to make the argument. Thus to argue ‘as a woman’ is to accept the identity and position the system you might wish to change has given you. As Butler puts it, ‘There exists no standpoint of critique that is not sustained by and complicit with the forces it seeks to transform.’

Butler’s critique of ‘identity politics and the politics of scapegoating’ doesn’t preclude agency, inasmuch as it does autonomy – One being a matter of choice and action and the other the inevitable situation of a person within the structure. She looks towards knowledge of the structure and awareness of our on position within it for some form of emancipation.

Ultimately, this critique doesn’t negate the possibility of critiquing the structure itself, or of positive change coming from within it. It just critiques a particular way of considering this change. The morality of the movement seeking to affect change does matter, even if it works from within the structure of power, and thus is essentially using the tools of the metaphorical master to deconstruct the house. At least the house is being deconstructed.

Consider Rosa Parks in the context of this critique of positional, identity based politics. As Butler points out, Parks’ position within power is essential to her critique of it, enabled by the same racism and classism it sought to overturn. And yet – that does not necessarily detract from her action. The civil rights movement and subsequent movements have been essentially productive, in their positional, flawed critiques of power as something external to themselves. Pragmatic, ideological political positions, doing their bit, seeking to overturn very real oppression, if not the very fabric of society itself, which may be the impossible ideal of freedom, and to better the lot of pragmatic, idealistic people are still productive, even as they shortchange some things for others, even as they’re led by ‘heroes’ and not radical democracy.

To change the meanings of identities, to change the fabric of society enough that these new identities can have power behind them, to affect reform, even from within the structure, a more even redistribution of power across fractured identities – that is not precluded by Butlers’ critique, and is certainly still productive, even as it is not precisely revolutionary. In the end waiting for the last to enter so that we can all enter is still a worthy goal to strive for, even if we accept that we do this within the strictures of a power system, through our own positions within it.