“They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.”

In her work called “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses”, Mohanty sets the stage by the various ways in which colonialism, as a discourse, is repeatedly employed by the West, be it about cultural appropriation, economic and political hierarchies, domination or understanding of the third world.

Particularly, understanding of ‘women’ of the third world. By Western Feminism.

Mohanty’s concern is with the creation, production and reference to the “third world women” as a singular, monolithic subject in recent Western feminist texts. The idea is to investigate the specific, methodological manner in which knowledge regarding the third world women is articulated, presented, and made popular. How and why a particular view or image of the third world women has increasingly become common, or convenient, is in question. While the author carefully points out the fact that Western feminist discourse is not homogeneous or unified, yet there exists certain points of coherence and convergence. Such areas are visible in the in the overarching and unsophisticated assumption(s) of the West regarding the third world women.

Western feminism defines itself via creating the ‘other’ as non-Western. Thus, Feminist scholarship is not just concerned with ‘producing’ knowledge regarding a subject, instead, it is to be understood as a political and discursive ‘practice’. An ideologically motivated practice, which intervenes into certain hegemonic discourses. It is, therefore, no surprise that feminist scholarship puts its entire emphasis on power-dynamics, which scholarly practices deal with in a number of ways. The author does, however, make it known that apolitical scholarship does not exist. She speaks of Western feminism in terms of colonialism and its attempt to ‘colonize’, to dominate and ignore, the differences and heterogeneity that exist in the lives of women in the third world, and convert this heterogeneity into a singular image, as reflection of the ‘Third World Woman’. Crucial to note here is the distinction made between woman and women. While ‘woman’ refers to a compound, unified identity based on certain ‘universal’ social and anthropological relations, ‘women’ is used for actual, historical subjects, with collective pasts and presents. Needless to say, this label of the ‘Third World Woman’ is approved by the Western humanist discourse, and carries with itself certain implicit assumptions convenient to the ideas, frameworks and perceptions of the West. In addition to deciding what ‘should’ be understood of the third world woman, confined to patriarchy and oppression, what exists within this label is a reductive notion which does not appreciate or recognize the existing complexities, differences and heterogeneous elements in what is known of women in the third world.

 The West comes from a hegemonic position, which consequently leads to the systematization of the women’s oppression in the third world, and it is through this homogenization that power relations are created. Thus the author makes the reader understand Western Feminist scholarship as a combination of two relating concepts: power and struggle. It seems, therefore, that a feminist eye coming from a Western setting cannot, or does not want to, understand the third world women as individuals with agency and independence. Rather the popular practice is to examine these women in dependency of someone else, either the men or the colonizer. Doing this, women are robbed of their individual identities and the very recognition of their agency, in whatever shape and form they have it. Evidently, this is problematic because the idea of the third world women then suggests women as dependent, struggling beings, oppressed, seen through their relations with X, as opposed to their existence as independent, individual identities. In other words, women are seen as functions of either patriarchy or colonialism, or both. This binary analytic is what the author is uncovering and challenging. While the author uses the works of many scholars on the subject, yet the defining characteristic remains the same; the effect(s) of representing third world women as a homogeneous category. What coheres the Western Feminist scholarship is defining women with an ‘object status’, a norm problematic, and a norm that needs to be challenged, for this ‘common’ understanding suggests being comfortable with keeping a certain category of women “outside history”.

Because women, particularly third world women, are constantly objectified, the immediate consequence this objectification and reductionist portrayal has is the image of women as immature and deprived of the very ethos of feminism. Or ‘Western’ feminism, in particular.  Owing to this system of establishing a universality when it comes to the third world women, the voices of women are affected despite class, cultural and regional differences. This universality has many a strand attached to it. These include constructing women in terms of religion, economic dependence, familial systems, patriarchy, violence and colonial processes. To narrow these strands down, what the author highlights is the cross cultural existence of “male domination and female exploitation”, as the crux of Western feminist writings on the third world women. Interestingly, the use of numbers and arithmetic methods comes into play too in aiding the idea of universality. Here becomes relevant the example of the veil, suggesting that the greater the number of women wearing the veil, the more widespread is the sexual control and domination over women. An overly simplistic and problematic method, but that is frequently employed in Western feminist works.

This method or popular discourse portraying women as powerless against possessing power undermines a very important badge that the third world women pride themselves in. This is the badge of revolutionary struggles, which must not be looked upon in binary terms. It is here, in the creation of ‘perpetually’ oppressed women that the role of colonial tendencies becomes clear. In other words, confining third world women into a unified, homogeneous category of oppressed, powerless women makes the first world women the uncontested and only ‘subjects’. The independent. The deciders. Consequently, it becomes impossible for third world women to rise above their object status in Western Feminist understanding. It is as if to say a particular category of women can not represent themselves, while the other can. The identified tension is, therefore, between self-presentation of Western feminists, and the ‘representation’ of the third world women by the same Western feminists.

The point to take away, therefore, is that such a framework only reflects a theoretical self portrayal of Western women and a flawed understanding of third world women, not a material reality. If that were the material reality, history would not be witnessing socio-political movements in the West, and challenging debates facing the West. If that were the material reality, there would be no struggles, no victories won by the third world women.

sisterhood

It is insufficient to state that third world women need to be versed and schooled in the ethos of Western Feminism, because it risks the likelihood of solidifying a limiting perception of their experience.  Even the use of the term ‘third world’ woman functions to restrain the possibility of imagining a woman from a post colonial context as anything but. Instead, there remains attached to it a conception of lack, whereby the subject is not evolved enough and so the danger of this association is that it authorizes Western notions of Feminism to voice their experiences.

Mohanty speaks precisely of this overpowering effect of the White voice within the archive of women’s experiences and expresses the danger of clustering women of the ‘third world’ under broadly stereotyped characterizations. She accurately points out that such efforts are reminiscent of imperialist traditions, except in only a more contemporary period. Therefore, now, to blindly attribute such an enfeebling attitude of Western Feminism to a higher mission of empowerment is only to accommodate a new version of imperial conquest, an attempt to control the heart and mind. 

However, it is also crucial to note that these are not isolated instances. Mohanty emphasizes how Western Feminism has developed a very binary understanding of women which is attached to the compartmentalization of the post colonial world into very limited frames of being. It is in fact through a very deliberate act of power and rooted in a unique political context, that this happening. In most cases, women in the post colonial world are seen as extensions of men or religion. That is to say, never as in or of themselves. They are the other and not complete in their own. The effect of this can be traced along a very deep tradition of Sati where Lata Mani talks about how these women were remembered as only either ‘heroines’ or ‘victims’. So as the fate of a Sati is limited to an either/or conception, therefore,  all possibility of recognizing or expressing each woman’s individual experience is foreclosed.

In much the same way, White feminism operates to foreclose any nuanced understanding of the complexity of women in the post colonial world. It functions as a part of the wider power structure that dictates the placement of individuals into groups and groups into nations, all as part of one collective whole with a single identity. As Mohanty explains, “third world women as a group or category are automatically and necessarily defined as: religious (read “not progressive”), family-oriented (read “traditional”), legal minors (read “they-are-still-not-conscious-of their-rights”),illiterate (read “ignorant”), domestic (read “backward”) and sometimes revolutionary (read “their-country-is-in-a-state-of-war-they-must-fight!”).”  What is associated with the the third world woman is a sense of regression, or a state of immobility which is the exact opposite of the White woman. What then conflicts with the supposed aim of White Feminism, to cast all women under the universal umbrella of the female experience of a ‘shared oppression‘, is exactly how divided their experiences are. There is no sisterhood, or at least not an equally accessible one. White Feminism, by its very existence argues against it.

On this premise of sisterhood thus, Mohanty sums up quite clearly the discrepancy in White feminism. First world woman, third world woman; its not so much a matter of both surviving together, fighting against the same oppression. Rather, its more that one enables and sustains the other. They exist on different planes, coming together as a whole ever so rarely; the first world woman thrives on the third world woman, she derives her strength from otherising her. She is doubly marginalized, cast on the outer folds of history and left to fight on her own.

 

 

Does First World Feminism carry Imperialist undertones?

Growing Up As a Girl in Iran, Fashion Was Always a Form of Protest

The mere absence of the female narrative in de-colonial and post-colonial studies can be regarded as one of the most important shortcomings of history. Buried beneath a layer that was twofold, the woman seems to be missing from the struggles for independence. The first layer being the narrative of the colonizer and secondly, the narrative of the patriarchal native.

The very foundation of Orientalism, Colonialism and Imperialism was grounded upon communal lumping. The problem lies in not just viewing a diverse group of people with their own conceptions of native history and culture as homogeneous, but also how this view informs colonial policy. First world feminism seems to echo this same issue. They firstly create a binary in terms of the all powerful man and the powerless woman and impose this across the third world. Local structures of power, traditions and religion is not taken into account and it is assumed that issues faced by all women across the e.g: the Arab world, South Asia, Africa are symmetric. The terminology that follows serves as evidence to First World Feminists engaging in communal lumping. Phrases such as “Women of Africa/Middle Eastern Women” are casually thrown around not just online but even in academic papers. Phrases as such completely ignore local level differences by grouping them under one banner.

“To treat them as a unified group characterized by the fact of their “exchange” between male kin, is to deny the socio-historical and cultural specificities of their existence.” – Mohanty

First World Feminism’s failure to understand women outside their relation to the patriarch freezes them in a timeless past. In an attempt to prevent “Western influence” the local patriarchs evoke religious tradition and authority, and in some cases even appeal to anthropology and science. Taking the example of Africa for example, Kenyatta in Facing Mount Kenya mentions the practice of female circumcision among the Giyuku people in Kenya and how the entire tribal system revolves around that practice as it serves as a rite of passage. The author closes by saying:

“The African is in the best position properly to discuss and disclose the psychological background of tribal customs, such as irua, etc., and he should be given the opportunity to acquire the scientific training which will enable him to do so. This is a point which should be appreciated by well-meaning anthropologists who have had experience of the difficulties of field-work in various parts of the world.” – Kenyatta

One can observe here how British attempts to directly attack a religious ritual without developing a micro level understanding of local culture infact has solidified tradition even further in the eyes of Kenyatta. Patriarchal relationships are hence reforged in the struggle to prevent foreign influence.

First world feminism attacking issues of patriarchy at a macro level not only bears similar results but also causes a major setback to local modes of female resistance who understand their native culture much better than someone addressing their issues in the “West”. Statistically even one may find local institutions of empowerment gaining much more traction than feminist institutions based on “western” scholarship. In our own local context in Pakistan, Al-Huda with around 200 branches dominates the Women’s Action Forum with its 3-4 branches as Al-Huda operates at a more grass root level, and also because the latter is seen as “liberal” and “corrupting” due to the states constant evocation of religious authority post-1947.

Related image
WAF Rally
Image result for al huda logo
Al Huda Logo

Chandra Mohanty talks about how First World Feminists sometimes equate the Veil with rape and prostitution. In doing so, they deny the Veil of its historical/cultural significance in terms of how it links to female dignity in Muslim societies. In some cases it has even been revolutionized to some extent for instance Fanon in “Algeria Unveiled” talks about how the Veil itself became a tool for combat which in return places women at equal footing as males:

“The Algerian woman rises directly to the level of tragedy.” – Fanon

Image result for battle of algiers veil

So the same veil that was seen as oppressive by First World Feminists and Colonialists became a source of empowerment for Women in Algeria, which according to Fanon places the “Algerian Women at the heart of combat”. Hence one can observe that the gaps that both First World Feminism and Imperialism create are immediately filled by timeless religion and culture.

In conclusion, the hegemony of Western scholarship plays a role in why First World Feminism spread rapidly and became the dominant discourse for feminism, while its ignorance of local contexts, cross border homogenization, cultural reductionism and marginalization of local feminist movements or modes of resistance has caused it to be heavily laden with imperialist undertones.

First-World Feminism and the Problem of Representation

It is without any doubt that Western scholarship holds a monopoly over the production, publication and distribution of information and ideas, in addition to harboring the power to influence modes of thought and to bring about institutional changes within society by means of ideas alone. This is one of the facts that Mohanty introduces her analysis of Western feminist scholarship with, in an article titled Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. The piece rests on the assumption that feminist scholarly practices are inscribed in relations of power, which is to say that these practices are inherently political; beset in forwarding, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the agenda of the group at the center. In the writings that Mohanty chooses to analyze, it is first-world women who constitute this center, with third-world women being at the periphery of the debate. First world feminism needs this third world woman subject- this figure of the oppressed third world woman- whose struggles it can appropriate in aiding the forwarding of its own agenda. The problem arises when these Western scholars view and attempt to speak for third-world women with an unchecked degree of ethnocentric universality, which not only misrepresents entire cultures and peoples, but undermines the individual struggles of the women in these societies. Through this biased lens, colonial mindsets are reified, calling then for a ‘white savior’- in this case the first-world feminist- to ‘represent’ the struggles of third-world women who cannot represent themselves. This appropriation of their individual struggles and the suppression of their heterogeneity by hegemonic white women’s movements is what feminist women of color in the U.S. describe as ‘colonization’; a label which begs the question- to what extent is first-world feminism imperialist?

Western or first-world feminist scholars make frequent use of binary analytics in their work, dividing and categorizing people into 2 vastly opposing groups: the powerless and the powerful, victims and oppressors, women and men. What this does, in effect, is group together all women into a single homogenous collective on the basis of shared dependencies or shared oppression. Adding the term ‘third-world’ as a prefix still ignores the fact that experiences, struggles and values differ across the various groups of third-world women. An example given by Mohanty of Western scholars choosing the fact of an institution over the value attached to that institution is that of the marriage ritual of Bemba women. The author in question, Cutrufelli, suggests that Bemba women, as a constituted group, are victims of the institution of marriage. This is an assumption made at face value, but a closer study of Bemba society reveals that the marriage ritual grants the Bemba woman greater rights and privileges than she had before marriage, with the initiation ceremony being ‘the most important act of a woman’s reproductive power.’ Similarly, the American writer and social activist, Fran Hosken, in her writings, equated the purdah with vices such as rape, domestic violence and prostitution, with zero regard for the varying cultural and ideological contexts within which women wore the purdah. Citing the example of Iran in 1979 when the purdah was worn as a symbol of solidarity with the working class, compared to modern day Iran where the purdah is a mandatory Islamic law, Mohanty explains that Western scholars need to exercise care in analyzing the ideological contexts of institutions, rather than jump to conclusions inspired by biased and ethnocentric views of the third world. This phenomenon of defining a single universal direction of progress and advancement, centered around the West, is an example of the colonial impact. What this does is, it invalidates the cultural values of non-Western societies, as well as their individual experiences and struggles. Societies which do not conform to the Western ideal are seen as ‘backward’ and ‘frozen in time’. It is in response to this colonial mindset that national liberation figures advocate for a ‘third way,’ and harbor a desire to redefine what progress means.

The American psychologist and anthropologist, Michelle Zimbalist, casually refers to third-world women in her feminist writings as “ourselves undressed”. By assuming that women in third-world countries share virtually the same difficulties and aspirations that women in first-world countries do, Western feminist scholarship makes the mistake of assuming that it can represent women of all races, classes, religions and castes. This limits the definition of women to gender identity alone, bypassing social class and ethnic identities, and only reinforces the binary of men and women; powerful and powerless subjects. On the other hand, when scholars write about third-world women, there is an even greater sense of ambiguity in the generalized terms that are used to identify the women. The terms ‘Arab women’ and ‘Muslim women’, are used interchangeably as though they denote the same thing, Similarly, the term ‘African women’ has been used by some scholars who are in fact writing about a very specific minority tribe from a country within Africa, inadvertently suggesting that all African women can be summarized and grouped together by a single term. Yet again, the stripping away of the individualities of the non-Western others, seeing them as merely belonging to a greater and generalizable collective, grouping them together by a single descriptive term such as ‘African’, is another example of colonialism at play.

What then is the point of referring to all women as a single homogenous group, and as having an equal share in the struggle of victimhood? As mentioned earlier, the struggles of third-world women, after they are appropriated by feminist scholars, serve as the legitimizers of the universal female struggle, and particularly that of first-world women. Mohanty, however, points out another agenda at play. She writes, ‘it seems evident that Western feminists alone become the true “subjects” of this counter-history. Third world women, on the other hand, never rise above their generality and their “object” status.’ This is the difference between Western feminist ‘self-presentation’ and the ‘re-presentation’ of women in the third world.

Thus, first-world feminist scholarship, through its ethnocentric universality, through its establishment of a homogenous unity among women centered around the West, through its generalizations and through its clouded lens of bias and ignorance towards non-Western cultures, is an imperialist practice. By maintaining, as Mohanty calls it ‘the third-world difference’ and the existing first/third world connections, such writings reinforce the assumption that ‘people in the third world just have not evolved to the extent that the West has.’

Imperialist feminism

‘[…] Colonization almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination, and a suppression-often violent-of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question. ‘ – Chandra Mohanty

Western feminist discourse, in Mohanty’s article serves to do two things – ahistoricize and homogenize the non-Western woman; and through that, construct the Western woman in opposition to this conceptual creation.

Sound familiar?

Just as the construction of the civilized Occident rested on the negation of the backwards and barbarous Orient, so does the construction of the educated, sexually liberated and agent-of-her own will first world woman rest on the negation of the oppressed, domestic and sexually repressed ‘third world woman’ as a homogeneous category.

Just as in the construction of an Other that could be barbarous or semi-barbarous, or almost-educated involved a hierarchy that automatically and implicitly perched the European self at the top and allowed all others to scramble among each other in trying to achieve an almost-equal status through trying to be European, through speaking their language, adopting their dress and learning their knowledge – for your language was sub-language more ‘dialect’, your dress was un-civilised, indecent, your knowledge illegitimate – so in the dialectic of Western feminism, there is one way to be ‘liberated’ – theirs. They are the ideal, and all others must strive to achieve it.

And finally, just as the ‘native’ became subject to study – his ‘traditions’, ‘superstitions’ – in short, his ‘backwardness’ was an object of study, so third world women, in their ‘victim-hood’ are frozen for study, like butterflies in glass – the subjects of traditional anthropological works such as ‘the Peoples of India’. They are then a homogeneous identity, understandable through abstract categorical understandings of power relations in an absolute sense; their dress is thus, their customs are thus their traditions are thus – their dress is thus; their oppression is thus; their economic dependence is thus.

One of the implications in this representational discourse the simplification and ahistoricization of complex cultural heterogeneity. In either case, where customs are ‘understood’ and ‘studied’ through the analytical ‘legitimate’ lens of the outsider, history is ignored and parallels are drawn between widely disparate communities on basis of a supposed commonality. In the colonial context this commonality was racial – in this case is the supposed commonality of women.

As such, the concept, thus, is that the experiences of one group of women, as understood through particular study, are then applicable to other women ‘in the same boat’ – or otherwise categorization as the objects of study, third world women, or women under Islam, or women in ‘developing countries’. They have issues and problems to be diagnosed and cured by the benevolent, overarching paternalism of, ironically, western feminism, but no agency, no internal shades of grey – of complex internal power dynamics that define and represent different meanings and choices within the simple categorization of woman.

The issue here is the power of representation. The right to make authoritative statements of a technically inferior Other, one for whom the only way to achieve the right to make their own statements is through achievement on the same skewed power hierarchy that confers this right.

And it’s through exercising this right that not only the third world woman is defined, but that in defining this oppressed third world woman, the implicit liberated first world woman emerges as well. Just as civilization meant westernization, women liberation must thus be conceived in western terms as well. Thus any attempt to create a narrative of alternate empowerment cannot read as empowerment except through the already existent signals of empowerment – inherently western that they are. In short, a liberated woman is a first world woman.

There’s an assumption of temporal inequality implicit within this discourse, a temporality not unfamiliar to the colonial discourse. Again the march to ‘progress’ is a singular and linear path, again the West is so much further along on the march towards an ideal humanity, again all others must tread in the West’s footsteps to better themselves. The third world will get there, of course – they simply haven’t evolved to the extent of the first yet.

The new orient is created within imaginations of women ‘the veiled woman’, ‘the abused women’, ‘the silenced women’ (which, come to think of it, is not that different from the original orient), oppressed by fundamentalist, traditionalist power structures in society, discourses that, in creating a newly morally superior occident, perpetuate an understanding of difference, an otherization that perpetuates, maintains and legitimizes power imbalances and abuses, both through the production of knowledge, or simply through the actual ‘benevolent’ policing of this Other.

While I wouldn’t go quite as far as to call western feminism classic fire-and-sword imperialism, I would consider it the modern-day, neo-colonial equivalent to the rhetoric of the Civilizing Mission, in that within the rhetoric is an established value judgement of an ideal, ethnocentric humanism wrapped up within benevolent packaging, justifying not so benevolent actions. It ends up serving a larger episteme of power imbalance, that, in turn, is the basis for imperialism, both neo and classically coercive.

Can the third world women speak?

Chandra Mohanty’s article is a response to feminist scholarship in the west  that is complicit in what Gayatri Spivak terms ‘epistemic violence’. This epistemic violence is rooted in the discourses about the third world women in the works of many feminist academics. This discourse enables viewing third world women as a static category that is ahistorical and treats them as a coherent unified group with no differences amongst them. The production of knowledge is immersed in the power relations that exist between the first and the third world. Mohanty’s article is an attempt at decolonising that knowledge production by calling it into question and highlighting the power imbalance.

These discourses have implications in real life affecting the way third world women see themselves and how they view other women who are different than them within their own society. This formulation of the third world women who are in need of being saved from the veil amongst other rituals, from the family, from Islam who are oppressing them. It has allowed for the west to justify invading Iraq and other places. Laura Bush publicly declared that they are intervening to save the women of these areas. This reflects how this reductionist singular view can be harmful and ethnocentric. 

Such saviour complexes also manifest themselves within third world feminists when they want to save the rural or working class woman. In the case of the third world, these binaries are reproduced in the way elite women view themselves as empowered, as opposed to the working class women who are oppressed. Such a binary does little to help the cause of women but rather supports a similar binary as the western feminists construct. The elite women then define themselves on the basis of what they are not and what the working class or rural  women are: uneducated, not having decision making power, traditional, backward.

Mohanty refers to the process of framing the third world women as a unified oppressed category as colonisation and as a postcolonial thinker, her article raises important questions about how there is a need of coalitions across race, class and ethnicity, and nations but those can only happen when there is an understanding of differences and historicity. Viewing women as lacking in agency reduces them to objects which are acted upon by patriarchy, family structure, religion, colonisation, male violence, etc.

Mohanty is careful to not engage in the same practice in her critique as she points out that she does not speak of the western feminism as a monolithic category, and thus avoids implying the same sort of heterogeneity in warning us how third world women might themselves engage in the production of these static categories.

I argue that empowerment is viewed as a destination rather than a journey in these western feminist texts, and that it can be injurious as it allows for the western woman to be posited as on the end of progress and the third world woman as not yet evolved enough. I question that if a transnational feminism is even possible if women are located or exist in very different contexts with different needs, interests and priorities differ.  

Chandra Mohanty and Third World Feminism

Chandra Mohanty’s article has been deeply important in analyzing intersectionality within feminist theory. It criticizes the work of First World Feminists which view the Third World Woman as perpetual and monolithic victim who has static wants and but be liberated by the enlightened Western Feminist. Through Mohanty’s analysis, one can understand both the dangers and the necessity in having feminist works that keep in mind historical contexts but also unifying ideas of struggle and liberation.

She highlights her objective for writing her paper every early on in the text: “…to create international links between women’s political struggles.” If the First World and Third World are bound together by historical, political and economic networks then there are political implications of how women of the West look at Third World Women. The crux of her argument comes in the end when she states that the Third World Woman does not exist as a baseline of all women but as a peripheral Other which allows the Western Feminist to take the centre of all matters concerning women’s liberation. One does not see the Third World Woman as sister to be liberated from her own struggles, but a gauge or worse, a living fossil for the First World Woman to remind herself of how far she has come. But what it means to be liberated in practical terms differs from discursive liberation on the basis of historical and cultural contexts. For example, Mohanty uses the example of how the veil came to represent liberation, defiance and oppression within different time periods of Iran’s history.

But by focusing too much on the contextual differences, one jeopardizes the existence of an overarching theory about oppression and liberation. Mohanty herself has no unifying theory and in an attempt to be creative, she risks committing the same mistake as First World Feminists i.e. being too simplistic in what constitutes as liberation or struggle. For example, Mohanty criticizes Hosken’s study of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as the study treats women as perpetual victims and men as perpetual accusers. However, the issue of FGM will never be simple, especially when one assumes a moral argument, because there will be women and men who will both support it and be against it. Additionally, cycles of prohibition and uniformity has the potential to treat First World Feminists as imperialistic perpetrators even if they do acknowledge and incorporate the work of indigenous feminists within their work (something that both Third and First World Feminism needs to be aware).  

Going back to her initial aim, it is still important to have some consensus on what feminist liberation and struggle look like. She is allowing room for a new kind feminist discourse which takes into account a sameness in oppression but also the difference in historical and cultural circumstances. Not only does this help escape simplistic binaries and vicious cycles but also allow room for agency on the part of women. Mohanty’s comments on Cutrufelli’s study of Bemba women is a great example of this. Mohanty argued that through certain ritual practices women had agency and the opportunity not just to overpower but to live in harmony with their husbands. Earlier, Mohanty herself admits that this kind of framework can be useful for any discourse that creates cultural Others. The issue of finding pockets of agency and resistance is particularly pertinent in contemporary situations which involve gender fluidity, migration or race within first world contexts.

The path to breaking out of this simplistic and problematic cycle is complicated and difficult to solve, but must be done anyway. Western Feminists maybe concerned with liberating their Third World sisters, but Western Feminists must understand their privileged positions is rooted in a theory which was created under “the hegemony of Western scholarly establishment” as Mohanty phrases it. To allow the existence of such a complication creates space for indigenous feminists to express her concepts of feminism without inadvertently using the Western feminist as an Other (thereby reinstating the same vicious cycle which fell on them) and perhaps bring about new concepts of what it means to struggle and to be liberated.

The ‘Other’ Woman

‘‘It is not the center that determines the periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness, determines the center.’’ Chandra Mohanty, ‘‘Under Western Eyes’’

The West’s worldview seems to be predicated upon binaries, at least in terms of description. Where there is an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, ‘White’ and ‘Non-White’, ‘Civilized’ and ‘Primitive’, among others. These juxtapositions leads to an understanding of the world in opposites where certain roles are ascribed for each to perform. In analyzing the publication in the Zed Press on the Third World Woman, Chandra Mohanty is able to show Western women’s ideas surrounding women from the underdeveloped world in her essay ‘Under Western Eyes’. Two ideas are prominent in this analyses which give ground to the argument that first world feminism is a form of imperialism, it is the White Feminists’ Burden.

The first is that a certain kind of third world woman is created which validate the role western feminism as a guardian. Homi Bhabha, in his essay “The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism’’, speaks of the relationship of the colonizer’s Self to the colonial subject, and his identification with that subject in terms of the fetish and anxiety with regards to them. The concept of the relation of this Self with the colonized is important because in Mohanty’s analysis she shows this similarity. She says: “[O]nly in so far as “Woman/Women” and “the East” are defined as Others, or as peripheral, that (Western) Man/Humanism can represent him/itself as the center” (353). Therefore, a certain distinction is drawn by creating a certain being, a woman who is different, upon whom certain ideas and stereotypes are repeatedly imposed to be able to justify the first world feminism’s own humanism. It justifies their existence, and while it might, as Mohanty also maintains, genuinely aim to reach some substantial gains, its ideals are propagated on a paternalism quite similar to the white man’s civilizing mission. It is these white women who are in a position to lend their hands to all women of the third world who are necessarily all oppressed, equally and without a nuanced context. As Mohanty argues, by looking at numbers they are able to make greater assumptions about the kinds of lives these women live that always exist in opposition to something else. And thus, their role and intervention becomes necessary and their humanism becomes justified.

Another way how first world feminism becomes imperialistic is through the focus on the woman and its relation to temporality. Mohanty shows that the third world woman categorized as a homogenous group are all argued to be “religious (read “not progressive”), family-oriented (read “traditional”), legal minors (read “they-are-still-not-conscious-of-their rights”), illiterate (read “ignorant”), domestic (read “backward”) and sometimes revolutionary (read “their-country-is-in-a-state-of-war-they- must-fight!”)”. This lens through which the third world woman is viewed is a lens of time in which the former is always behind. Words like “not progressive”, “traditional”, “still not conscious’’, ‘‘illiterate’’, ‘‘ignorant’’, ‘‘backward’’, all denote that the woman has not caught up and needs to be pushed and saved because she is in a historical time. This is a similar lens that the colonialist applied to justify its intervention around the world because it thought it its duty to save those who had not caught up. Thus, the burden. And this idea again shows how first world feminism is imperialistic.

Therefore, Mohanty’s analysis of the articles in the Zed Press shows the paternalism prominent in the first world feminists’ ideals very similar to the colonialist mission of civilization. In essence, the third world woman creates a space for first world feminism to exist.

The struggle for selfhood

How important is culture to national liberation?

According to Cabral, the colonizer is able to oppress the colonized because of the negation of the culture of the colonized. Cabral keeps on arguing that the culture of the colonized is dynamic and a product of the history of the natives and hence is an expression of the continuity of history. The advent of the colonizer “paralyses” the culture of the colonized; makes it static because, essentially colonization ruptures time itself, for the colonized people are trapped in stale ideas of superiority and inferiority introduced by the colonizer.

Therefore, Cabral argues that the rediscovery and reinvention of African culture is pivotal to national liberation. Cabral, however, is clearly cognizant of the fault lines in this thesis. He argues that there is no uniform culture of the colonized people and culture varies across different social divisions within a society. He further claims that the process of cultural alienation deployed by the colonizer successfully creates an indigenous elite which either despises or is ignorant of the cultural values held by the masses. This is problematic because in absence of clear-cut objectives of the national liberation, these individuals adhering to the colonized mindset can become leaders of the national liberation and thereby they will reproduce the same social structures that the colonizer brought.

Cabral essentially talks about the “culture of the peoples of Africa”, which preserved despite massive repression by colonization, as the principle weapon in the struggle for selfhood. However, Cabral again is very conscious of the fact that national culture must not be glorified without keeping in view its shortcomings and that there is a need of a discourse with regards to culture itself and what it means for varying sections of the society from the peasants to the townsmen to the intelligentsia. He is arguing against viewing culture as a static entity, which is first and foremost a colonial legacy. He argues for the transformation and transcendence of various “cultures” into the nationalist culture through the principle of discourse. The discourse must also not be limited to varying sections within society but also needs to consider what the new, evolving culture can learn from other cultures, including the culture of the colonizer as an acknowledgement of what has happened and what needs to be done.

The objective of the nationalist struggle is that it should be free of all prejudice and exploitation and that is why it is necessary to examine what exactly the indigenous elite is fighting for within the struggle for national liberation. Is it the liberation of Africa or a selfish struggle to safeguard their individual interests? Cabral argues that armed nationalist struggle must be very cognizant of all these factors and must constantly try to create engagement within its ranks. He argues that the armed struggle is created by culture, but it is also creating culture. Cabral is talking about the restoration of the dynamism of Africa’s culture, and that is precisely how the nationalist struggle will heal the rupture in time caused by colonization.

Cabral’s Diagnosis & Prescription

For Cabral, there exists a striking commonality between foreign domination and its antithesis, national liberation, that of their understanding of, and engagement with, culture.

Calling culture, a vigorous manifestation of the materialist and historical reality of society, Cabral develops this notion further by analogizing it with a plant. The roots of which plunge into the material reality of the soil but, nevertheless, whose growth and vitality depends on factors beyond just its foundation based in forces of production. He uses this analogy to highlight just how dynamic the manifestation of culture is, and this analogy is always at the background of his speech, sometimes represented by an influenced flower, sometimes as the very seed of popular, mass indigenous resistance.

To describe culture in these terms allows for an understanding of the organic nature of the entire enterprise. Culture to Cabral is not static, in fact, he believes that culture untainted by foreign domination and intervention is on a trajectory guided by an organic process, like a plant that takes sustenance from its roots and grows if the external conditions are conducive. Imperialist domination, however, is the negation of, what he describes as, the true historical process of the oppressed people.

The Imperialist domination is only exacted by, and maintained, Cabral argues, by the harnessing, and subsequent creation of, particular manifestations of culture. Cabral’s notion of culture, and how it can be manipulated, is inextricably linked with class. He illustrates this relationship fully when he speaks of two broad categories of colonized peoples, the indigenous elite and the rural leaders.

The former is assimilated into the oppressor’s culture to such an extent that their own culture, their roots if one is to follow the analogy, becomes alienating for them. Strangers in their own land, they adopt the habits, sophistication, and tastes of the oppressors to the extent that they may even simply become unaware of the existence of a people, just like them, whom they share roots with. These assimilated elite, ones who Fanon would say to possess Black Skins but White Masks, are able to rise up the ranks and often take up the leadership of the national liberation struggle itself, something Cabral emphatically cautions against, in that their cultural alienation remains consistent long after foreign powers are cast off and this proves damning for all national liberation movements. The second category is that of the privileged groups in rural areas, they are similarly co-opted by the oppressive foreign regime but an emphasis in class is paramount in understanding their importance. Their cultural assimilation may be close to nil, but colonial administrations are able to harness, and sometimes create, their cultural authority over popular masses. Knowing full well of the dangers of the popular masses if they manifest anything culturally significant, colonial administrations support and protect the prestige of cultural influence of the indigenous ruling classes by granting them material privileges.

It is not to say that the groups discussed above are not interested in national liberation, given the material privileges that they exact via the oppressive regime, but, in fact, are almost always at the forefront of the struggle. Cabral is deeply suspicious of this and argues that their cultural assimilation, alienation, and supported cultural authority, allows for them to hijack the resistance and maintain the very structures that informed colonial oppression in the first place. This analysis is prophetic, in that it cuts across almost all instances of colonial administration and the subsequent national liberation movements they give rise to, consequences of which we see in almost all “independent” colonial states to this day.

Cabral makes a case that dominated peoples can only be culturally free when i) they understand the positive contributions of the oppressor’s culture, ii) of other cultures, iii) recapture the commanding heights of their own culture, and iv) equally reject the harmful influences of foreign culture. In this way, the dynamic nature of culture is revealed. He is simultaneously able to make an argument for the manifestation of a universal culture of resistance, one that does not necessarily rely on its roots alone, but also communicates with the sentiments of other liberation struggles, but, nevertheless, has it its own distinct character due to its distinct historical backdrop.

Cabral’s diagnosis of the problem is extremely sound, but his prescription is suspect of utopianism. The solution, Cabral thinks, is to, in a sense, cast away the very phenomenon that worsened and tightened colonial grip on the minds of the indigenous peoples. To meet this end, the national liberation struggle, one of a mass, popular kind, is indispensable and becomes a cultural phenomenon in itself.

The resistance, for Cabral, can bring together various social categories of people, including the two groups described above, into the fold of a single converging, popular, indigenous and mass national cultural force in the mold of an armed struggle. Through this armed resistance, itself, the indigenous ruling elite will become aware of the existence of their brethren, ones they could not even identify before, and the laboring masses will be able to cross the boundary of their village when they will see their indispensable role in the national liberation movement.

To Cabral, the national liberation will become a cultural reality in itself, clinging to which the identity of the entire indigenous populace, irrespective of their historical background, or if the analogy still flows, their roots, will take shape, and in doing so oppressed peoples will be liberated from their oppressor’s grip.